Author:
Reuters
The Serbian government’s official website gives excerpts of the interview.
On upcoming negotiations:
Belgrade’s main idea is to try to reframe relations with UNMIK with the aim of safeguarding peace and stability in the province. This is one of the positive results achieved in the most recent meeting with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, as well as the fact that now the UN Secretary General is formally obliged to initiate an investigation into the events of March 17 in the northern part of Kosovo-Metohija. Belgrade can also be satisfied with the messages sent out during Ban Ki-moon’s visit to Moscow. Now it is very important that the jurisdictions which were given to the UN by Resolution 1244 are not transferred to any other institution in Kosovo.
On Serbia’s strategy to demand at the UN General Assembly session in September that the International Court of Justice should be consulted regarding Kosovo’s unilateral independence:
All unilateral moves by Pristina, starting with the declaration of independence itself and those leading on form that, have absolutely no legal validity for us. We have declared them to be null and void. We are fighting against unilateral moves with all diplomatic and legal means. There are two key institutions in the UN, the Security Council and the General Assembly. The Security Council is completely divided and blocked. One half of the members are on one side and the other half, on the other, including the permanent members. Ordinarily in such situations the General Assembly is consulted. The idea of raising the question of the legality of the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has a double significance. Firstly, a large majority of countries which are currently considering what stance to take regarding the unilateral independence will have better grounds on which to withhold recognition and wait for the opinion of the ICJ. This will limit the number of countries ready to recognise Kosovo. Secondly, this will bring us further into the area of international justice, where our arguments are stronger. The time that we have until September also gives us the chance to be active and convey our stance to as many UN member countries as possible. This is a diplomatic battle in which I think that until this point we have a slight advantage.
Seeking the opinion of the ICJ is a complicated and diplomatic process, for which we, as the outgoing government, are making preparations. The government that will be elected on May 11 will decide whether to go ahead or not.
On the factual situation argument Pristina refers to:
As far as international law is concerned, that factual situation is not the only factor. We are using all the diplomatic and legal means at our disposal to challenge the declaration of independence. Our stance will pack far more punch if it is affirmed by voting in the General Assembly in September which would prove that a unilateral approach has not produced results and that we must keep the entire situation within the framework of international law.
On recalling ambassadors from countries which have recognised Kosovo:
The range of diplomatic steps is fairly wide. The first step is recalling ambassadors for consultations, and the last is breaking off diplomatic relations. In between there are a large number of steps and we will make all our moves in accordance with a dynamic view of the situation. We have chosen a strategy which gives a reasonably clear signal that we are fundamentally opposed to the policy of recognising Kosovo and recalling ambassadors carries considerable weight in this context. On the other hand, it does not limit our options for future action. We must be careful all the time and try to keep a balance between sending strong signals of opposition and making all possible efforts not to isolate our country. This is the optimal measure which leaves us with options for an even more serious response, if further developments make that necessary.
On the letter by French and Slovenian foreign ministers which puts forward recognising Kosovo as a condition for Serbia’s entry to the EU:
I can understand that some countries would like to set that as a condition, which is totally unacceptable for us. Bearing in mind the manner in which the EU’s foreign policy is formed, which is by consensus, I do not expect that we will see a situation where the EU can set that condition. The fact is that some EU countries have not recognised Kosovo, and have even stated explicitly that they have no intention of doing so. Since all EU members do not recognise Kosovo, it is hard to imagine how all 27 countries, including those who have not recognised Kosovo, will set this condition.