The Serbian government’s official web site gives excerpts of the interview.
In your opinion, what actions would imply the recognition of Kosovo’s independence?
Primarily the signing of the agreement with the EU, without previously establishing whether the EU officially respects Serbia’s internationally recognised borders, particularly if we bear in mind that a considerable number of EU members have recognised the unilateral independence and that the EU illegally deployed the EULEX mission. That is in my opinion a sort of indirect recognition of Kosovo’s unilateral independence.
Your standpoint is – yes to EU integration, but with Kosovo as Serbia’s constituent part. If Brussels does not agree to that, what is Serbia’s option if not the EU?
This conflict has been intentionally made ambiguous to a certain extent. Choices are an opportunity to affirm the two principles of the current policy – that Kosovo-Metohija is a constituent part of Serbia and that Serbia as a whole state should continue with EU integration.
I will particularly emphasise that all parties are in favour of Serbia’s EU entry; therefore, after the elections we should talk about what to do next, because after February 17 we have not had the chance to hold any serious talks. We negotiated about other matters, technical ones, but not on how the EU sees Serbia, what Serbia represents to the EU, where are its borders, what does international law mean.
It is extremely important that the people should choose a state-making and a nationally responsible government, authorised to begin talks with the EU based on clear principles, and not to blindly accept in advance that there is no alternative to something, because we will then find ourselves being told what to do. Instead, this issue, which is in fact the issue of Serbia’s future, should be discussed with the EU on an equal footing.
What will happen if the EU rejects Serbia’s stances?
The talks have not even begun. It is important to start the negotiations, during which Serbia must advocate clear stances which are valid for all other European states.
We are asking you this because all your invitations to define Serbia’s borders have fallen on deaf ears in Brussels.
We must strongly insist on that and no one in Serbia has the right to accept silence as a response. It is inconceivable for both Belgrade and Brussels to close important agreements without first clarifying the key issue – Serbia’s borders within which that agreement will be valid.
Does that dialogue also imply talks on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA)?
It implies talks about everything, including the SAA, which in its initialled version guarantees Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Does that mean that you would sign such an agreement?
The agreement itself is not contestable, but another question has now arisen and it concerns the stance of countries which in the meantime recognised the unilateral independence of Kosovo. This is the problem we should discuss. Article 135 of the initialled SAA guarantees Serbia’s territorial integrity. Countries that recognised the province’s unilaterally declared independence no longer see Serbia within these borders mentioned in the initialled agreement. Once the SAA is signed, parliaments of all member countries will have to ratify it. How can those countries have the same stance about two completely different situations?
Why don’t we sign the SAA if ratifying it is their problem?
First of all, no one has offered it to us after February 17, and second, we have to talk with the EU about the illegal arrival of its civilian mission to Kosovo, which directly violates Resolution 1244. The EU is in fact the creator of this fictitious state. These two issues must be resolved.
You said no one has offered the SAA. If it were offered, would you sign it?
The form in which the agreement was initialled is acceptable for Serbia, because at one point it is stressed that there is only one mission in Kosovo, and that is UNMIK. That is particularly important. After February 17 and the unilateral independence we have another problem and that is the interpretation of Article 135. Therefore, this issue and the issue of the legal basis for EULEX’s arrival are still open.
The next government must determine the two known principles: that Kosovo is Serbia and that Serbia as a whole state can join the EU. Then we must see Brussels’ stance, which is so far unknown.
How can the EU conduct these talks if one group of countries recognises Kosovo’s independence and the other does not?
This must be sorted out and that is the task of the future government and Brussels. It is important that many countries, more than 150 of them, have not acknowledged the unilateral impendence, and the number of those who did is not impressive. Palestine was recognised by 108 countries, Western Sahara by 70 and in this case only 30 or so.
Self-isolation is often mentioned in Brussels. Is that actually a threat that the EU will isolate Serbia?
The mere idea of a country isolating itself is inexplicable. That has never happened in world history. That is the worst kind of propaganda. Instead of propaganda, it is necessary to launch serious talks with the EU. The difference between the parties and people that you mention is that we want those kind of talks, while the other side believes that the thing has already been solved. They believe that there should not be any obstacles on Serbia's road to Europe, therefore no serious talks either, and that everything should be concluded by the fact that we will never recognise the independence of Kosovo. That means absolutely nothing.
What if the talks with the EU about Serbia's borders end unfavourably?
We shouldn't talk about the outcome of the talks before they start. It is inexplicable what happened with the talks on Kosovo which were conducted under the patronage of the UN. First of all, owing to the US, at one moment, it was said: there will be no more talks, all possibilities have been exhausted. There are so many countries in the world whose disputes have been discussed for decades, simply because talks and agreements are always better than imposed solutions.
Can Serbia defend its interests adequately in the countries from which it withdrew its ambassadors?
Yes. The withdrawal of ambassadors is the message that we have a problem with those states on a political level. Political cooperation with those countries that recognised unilateral independence must be reduced, not as an act of revenge, but because we want to discourage other countries from doing the same. On the other hand, we have an interest in cooperating with those countries economically. Economic cooperation can only be of help and on the international level, has no negative effects on our defence of Kosovo. The withdrawal of ambassadors does not reduce the possibilities for developing economic cooperation.
There is an opinion that Serbia's maximum at the political and diplomatic plan is to prevent as many countries as possible from recognising the independence of Kosovo. Do you think Serbia can do more than that?
Yes. First of all, the number of countries that did not recognise the independence of Kosovo is important. If a great number of countries refuse to recognise it, the unilateral independence of Kosovo will become even more disputable and illegitimate. On the other hand, we must press charges. I don't understand at all why that is being avoided since that move would open a discussion before the International Court of Justice.
Is it because that might be senseless? The court might declare itself incompetent on that issue?
Then many distinguished lawyers are in the wrong, or they don't know their job well, which I doubt. At the end of the day, a person can take a legal suit and have many pieces of good evidence and finally lose it, for this or that reason. But it is important to have it. Finally, it is important to win the public over, the denial in itself is important.
What is the final effect of all those measures – activities aimed at not recognising independence, pressing charges, returning Kosovo into our consitutional order?
We have to have a goal. If we do all this it is more likely that we will achieve it, and if we don't do anything there is no way that we will achieve it. That's the point. We can prove the unsustainability of the project of Kosovo as an independent state. The supporters of independence point out several arguments. First, the number of Albanians in Kosovo. Second, the 1990s. History cannot be put into several years and it does not end in 1999. The third argument is: Kosovo cannot develop if it doesn't have a state. And then at the same time it is said that Kosovo does not meet the basic conditions for being a state. And time will show that it simply cannot survive as a state because institutions are not functioning and because of the corruption that affects the region, and more than the region. And if you don't accept the independence of Kosovo, if you fight before the courts, if you renounce it in public, if a great majority of countries refuse to recognise Kosovo’s independence, if that quasi-state is not functioning from the very beginning, then as time goes by it can be seen that we really proposed a compromising and sustainable solution: that Kosovo develops completely independently with substantial autonomy within Serbia. Therefore, it will make decisions about its future, but does not jeopardise Serbia's borders. That is the solution.
When you speak about sustainability, perhaps you are forgetting that most
European politicians want the EU mission to stay in Kosovo for years?
That will not solve things. KFOR and UNMIK have been present in Kosovo-Metohija for years and to what effect? KFOR had 50,000 troops in the beginning and it didn't prevent ethnically motivated crimes. It did not provide, just like UNMIK, conditions for a large number of Serbs and non-Albanians who were expelled to return to Kosovo. Nothing has been done.
You laid wreaths on the anniversary of the death of former Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. What were you thinking about at that moment?
About all the pains we went through during those eight years and before. I thought about the problems that were solved and those that still persist. I thought about that, those incredible pressures, conditions that have been placed on Serbia since October 2000. As if nothing has changed. But in reality a lot has changed. Zoran Djindjic was prime minister at a very difficult time and dealt with great difficulties. We agreed about some things, and had different opinions about some others. But the gravity of problems and challenges before Serbia just won't diminish.