On ways to resolve situation in Kosovo-Metohija and mechanisms of protection of Kosovo Serbs:
The only solution for the survival of Serbs in Kosovo-Metohija is to establish institutional guarantees for their autonomy. The Serbian government adopted a draft plan on the province's territorial autonomy, which stipulates new institutional guarantees for autonomy of Serbs and non-Albanians within the Kosovo autonomy. The government is resolved not to depart from such a position because every other solution is senseless.
On the type of autonomy:
It is a two-tier type of autonomy, envisaging territorial autonomy for those areas in which Serbs live in compact wholes and represent a majority. That is the case only in a small part of Kosovo-Metohija. Personal and cultural autonomy is envisaged for all those who live scattered around the province in small enclaves. This plan is based on the United Nations Security Council's Resolution 1244 and the Constitutional framework and therefore no one can complain that we did not respect the existing legal frameworks. I told my collocutors from the international community that the standards for Kosovo-Metohija and plan for their implementation is a pure utopia, because the reality is completely different.
On whether the draft plan specifies areas in which autonomy will be applied:
The government's draft plan does not contain maps, but clearly defined principles. The idea is to have autonomy within the autonomy. The rights of Serbs and non-Albanians are supported by the idea of territorial autonomy, because it is a precondition for personal and cultural autonomy of Serbs who live outside compact Serbian municipalities.
On whether the government has alternative plans or some stricter stance on the issue if the draft plan is not supported:
The resolution of Kosovo issue is a great risk, and all heads of the UNMIK administration have had a predominantly optimistic and bureaucratic approach to it. As a rule, they were unfamiliar with Kosovo reality, unprepared to take any risks. Therefore, things must be resolved in another way - with a firm stance of the Serbian government and the State Union of Serbia-Montenegro not to desist from the solution proposed. We do not say that this solution cannot be altered in some aspects, but its essence must not be changed because it offers necessary additional institutional guarantees for safety of Serbs. We have seen that there has been no safety for Serbs with 17,500 KFOR soldiers around. It did not exist with 48,000 soldiers and therefore we can logically conclude that it will not exits with 100,000 soldiers as well. Such a security system, without a political solution, is not good. I see that political solution in territorial autonomy and desisting from senseless statements that it is possible to achieve a multiethnic paradise in Kosovo as soon as tomorrow. It is necessary that Serbs, other non-Albanians and ethnic Albanians live next to each other and enjoy certain rights - concerning local government, security, education, culture, health... That is the only solution. So when we are calling for institutional guarantees, we are not doing it just for the sake of human rights or private property, but rather for the sake of mere survival of those people. For the sake of the right to life. And that's why we'll never give up. To put it simply, the Serbian government sees no other solution to this problem. If I had to give it up now, I would not be able to do my job any more.
On current political circumstances in Serbia and to what extent they facilitate or hamper efforts to resolve the Kosovo-Metohija problem:
The circumstances are more favourable now than they used to be, as we now have institutions in both Serbia and the state union to deal with (Kosovo) issue. They are operational and their legitimacy is not in question. I think that March 17 brought down to earth all those who had thought that the Kosovo issue could be resolved by piles of papers and promises that a multiethnic paradise was almost created. The international community must look in the mirror and admit that next to nothing has been done in the field of security in the five years of (international) presence in the province. Until March 17, this had been hidden behind piles of documents, which made no significant improvement. But March 17 put an end to it and underlined the fact that there was no security in Kosovo-Metohija and that ethnic cleansing was under way.
On why he is not running in the Serbian presidential election:
The reasons for that are twofold. First, because I have started doing this job, and not enough time has passed for what I have done to yield visible results. Some results are visible though, but it would be too irresponsible to give up the job now. On the other hand, I had an experience of being Yugoslavia's president a couple of years ago. That was a position which had a significance as regards its authority, but I had little real power to carry out certain plans. I had ideas how to build and strengthen institutions but I was curbed by limited competencies of the president. Therefore, this is now an opportunity to work on the strengthening of the institutions, the rule of law, and fight against corruption.
On the government's achievements so far, relations with the international community and international financial institutions:
To me, it was essential to create institutions and to complete them. To make all political parties take part in the work of the parliament. No doubt that this is a normal thing, but we had to create conditions for it. I consider it my own achievement that we managed to revive the institutions, despite the barrage I was exposed to. I am satisfied with the first steps. But these achievements are regarded as something normal and are therefore not noticeable. Only some political analysts see them, and they say: "you have managed to make all political parties legal." Well, if nobody has banned them, they are legal. You must go one step beyond that - to make some changes there. The difference between domestic and international perceptions of certain political parties will gradually be removed, and everyone in the parliament will be able to cooperate and make arrangements concerning the makeup of the government without provoking reactions from abroad. Once we have dealt with that issue, we will step into something that can be called democracy without any reservations.
On relations with Montenegro:
Recent statements by the Montenegrin leadership have suggested readiness to respect the Constitutional Charter, and to restrain from bringing up the issue of independence before the three years (during which Serbia and Montenegro agreed not to vote on independence) have elapsed. Even then, a referendum is a possibility rather than something inevitable. The appreciation of the advantages of living together, instead in two separate states, has been prevailing in both Serbia and Montenegro.
On reasons for passing a law on the rights of those detained by The Hague:
The real motive is to introduce some order in the defence of the interests of the state before the Hague tribunal and to ensure that those indicted do not jeopardise the state interests while defending themselves. So far, only Serbs have pleaded guilty and made settlements with the Hague tribunal at the expense of the truth. When it comes to indictees of other nationalities, where there have been coordination between the state and the indictees, there no such examples have been recorded. Besides, this might cost us in the case (against Yugoslavia) before the International Court of Justice - where it is facing claims by Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina for war reparations. This law was passed, among other things, to prevent that. It could also encourage some indictees to surrender to the court voluntarily.
On the Hague tribunal's demand for the arrest of four generals:
The indictments against four generals were revealed during the previous government's term of office. This turned out to be a big problem because the issue here is "command responsibility" and the question is how far the chain of command goes. This criterion has already sent the federal president, the president of Serbia, the federal deputy prime minister and the army chief of staff to the Hague. The second issue is the stability of domestic institutions and the need for Serbia to take over the cases.
On whether the four trials could be Serbia's first war crime trials:
We have to come up with a solution because the list of demands is rather long. It is not only the number of indicted Serbs but also the types of offices they held. This harms the stability of institutions, not only in the country but also in the region. It would be unrealistic to believe that the government can avoid cooperating with the Hague tribunal. The government will not be unconstructive, but will try to find a solution through a dialogue with the Hague. Everything has to end, even the Hague trials.